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A U T H EN TIC A T E! 
U .S. G O V E RN  M EN 
IN FO RM ATIO N  
G P
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
RONALD K. KINCHION, )
)
Plaintiff, ) CIVIL ACTION ACTION 
)
v. ) No. 12-1203-MLB
)
CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, )
)
)
)
Defendant. )
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case comes before the court on cross motions for summary 
judgment. (Docs. 82, 83). The motions have been fully briefed and 
are ripe for decision. (Docs. 84, 85, 86, 88, 89). Plaintiff's 
motion is denied and Cessna's motion is granted for the reasons 
herein.
I. Facts1
Plaintiff Ronald Kinchion worked approximately 15 years at 
Cessna as a small-parts finish painter. Plaintiff worked in 
Department 28, Paint and Processing, prior to his termination.
Plaintiff's Medical History at Cessna
On May 11, 2007, plaintiff filed a suit against Cessna alleging 
disability discrimination and other claims. Plaintiff and Cessna 
entered into a settlement agreement where Cessna agreed to comply with 
Kansas law.
1 Plaintiff's response failed to controvert the facts as required 
by D. Kan. 56.1. Therefore, Cessna's statement of facts is deemed 
uncontroverted.
3
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In October and November 2008, plaintiff requested intermittent 
FMLA leave which was approved by Cessna. On February 1, 2011, 
plaintiff again requested intermittent leave and the request was 
granted. On February 11, 2011, plaintiff reported a cyst on his right 
wrist and, subsequently, filed a worker's compensation claim regarding 
the cyst.
On March 28, 2011, Kim Chacon, an ergonomist at Cessna, 
conducted an ergonomic survey of plaintiff in order to determine the 
cause of his pain. During the survey, plaintiff stated that he 
prefers to paint with his right hand but is able to paint with both 
hands. Plaintiff informed Chacon that he had pain in both hands and 
wrists. Chacon then observed plaintiff while he worked and noted that 
plaintiff constantly switched fingers for the trigger and used both 
hands to paint.
On April 21, 2011, plaintiff's doctor placed restrictions on his 
right hand which stated that plaintiff could paint occasionally with 
his right hand. The doctor did not restrict work activity with 
plaintiff's left hand.
On September 29, 2011, plaintiff had surgery on his right hand 
to correct a work-related injury. On October 3, plaintiff returned 
to work with restrictions. Plaintiff was prohibited from painting 
with his right hand but was able to paint with his left hand for up 
to two hours.
Disciplinary Procedure at Cessna
The disciplinary procedure at Cessna contains a maximum of five 
steps. At step 1, employees are given a verbal warning. At step 2, 
employees are given a written reprimand. On step 3, an employee is
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given a warning in lieu of suspension or the decision maker may skip 
the warning step and go directly to step 4, a three-day suspension. 
The final step, number 5, is termination. In this case, Kinchion 
received the benefit of all five steps. In assessing which stage of 
the disciplinary procedure an employee is at, the employee's 
discipline over the previous nine months is taken into account.
Supervisors at Cessna are referred to as "Value Stream Leaders" 
(VSLs). VSLs have the authority and discretion to discipline 
employees, but they also work with Cessna’s Human Resources Department 
("HR") on employee discipline issues. VSLs ensure that the employees 
under his or her supervision are generating work-product that meets 
Cessna’s quality expectations. Employees who fail meet quality 
expectations may be subjected to discipline up to and including 
termination of their employment.
Plaintiff's Discipline History
On April 27, 2011, VSL Davis gave plaintiff a verbal warning 
about the poor quality of his work after determining that the paint 
applied by plaintiff was too thin on approximately 40 parts.
On August 18, 2011, VSL Simmons assigned plaintiff to paint two 
parts by using the "fill and drain" method. Plaintiff had knowledge 
of this method and had painted with the method in the past. 
Plaintiff, however, refused to paint the parts and claimed that he did 
not know how to do it. Simmons asked other painters to demonstrate 
the method to plaintiff. Winesberry, the crew chief, explained the 
method to plaintiff and plaintiff painted the parts applying an 
excessive amount of primer on the outside of the parts. Simmons 
determined that the parts would not pass inspection and had to be sent
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offsite to be stripped and reprocessed.
Simmons investigated the incident to determine the appropriate 
action. After Simmons concluded that plaintiff had knowledge of the 
painting method and reviewed plaintiff's verbal warning in April 2011, 
Simmons gave Kinchion a written reprimand on August 22. Plaintiff 
objected to the reprimand and filed a grievance with the union. After 
negotiations, Cessna and the union agreed to allow the reprimand on 
plaintiff's record for only two months, rather than the normal time 
period of nine months.
On October 6, 2011, Simmons assigned plaintiff to work in the 
painting booth. At this time, plaintiff was restricted by his 
physician from the use of his right hand to paint but was allowed to 
paint with his left hand. Plaintiff, however, objected to painting 
in the booth and stated that he could not paint with his left hand. 
Simmons told plaintiff that she expected him to work in the both for 
two hours as allowed by his restrictions. Ultimately, plaintiff 
worked in the booth and painted the parts. After reviewing the work, 
Simmons determined that plaintiff had applied an excessive amount of 
paint which caused drips and "blisters." The parts were not usable 
and had to be sanded down and repainted.
Simmons investigated the incident for potential disciplinary 
action, reviewed plaintiff's file and spoke with other VSLs at Cessna. 
Simmons also checked with Health Services to determine the history of 
plaintiff's work restrictions. Simmons concluded that plaintiff was 
able to paint with his left hand and that plaintiff did not like to 
work in the painting booth. On October 7, 2011, Simmons gave
plaintiff a warning in lieu of suspension.
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On that same day, Simmons again assigned plaintiff to work in 
the painting booth and instructed Winesberry to observe and coach 
plaintiff. While observing, Winesberry told plaintiff that he was 
applying too much paint. Plaintiff did not turn the paint gun down 
and instead began applying more paint to the parts. Winesberry 
repeated her request to turn down the gun and plaintiff did not 
respond. Winesberry left the area and notified Simmons that plaintiff 
was severely over-painting the parts. By that time, plaintiff had 
over-painted eighteen out of twenty parts which had to be reworked. 
Simmons reported the incident to HR.
Chris Manuel, an HR Manager, investigated the incident by 
reviewing plaintiff's file and interviewing various Cessna employees. 
Manuel also interviewed plaintiff who claimed that he did not know how 
to paint with his left hand. Plaintiff's statement, however, 
conflicted with other reports that indicated plaintiff could paint 
with his left hand. Manuel concluded that plaintiff did know how to 
paint with his left hand and therefore, disciplinary action was 
appropriate because of the deficient quality of plaintiff's work. 
Simmons also concluded that plaintiff's actions were intentional. 
Plaintiff was given a three-day suspension, which moved him to step 
4 of the disciplinary procedure.
On December 19, plaintiff was assigned to paint "gas shocks." 
These parts are visible to the client and must be painted perfectly. 
The parts should be hung up or propped up while painting and cannot 
be placed in the oven. The parts were designated a "priority 2” which 
meant that they were to be worked on immediately. Plaintiff 
improperly placed the parts in the oven and painted the parts on a
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rack which resulted in the parts being stuck to the shelving unit. 
On December 20, a co-worker told plaintiff that the parts would be 
rejected by quality control. Plaintiff did not immediately repaint 
the parts but decided to leave the parts to fix the next day. The 
parts ultimately had to be reworked.
On December 21, Chuck Miller, a crew chief at Cessna, informed 
Manuel of plaintiff's unacceptable painting. Manuel investigated the 
incident. In determining whether to discipline plaintiff, Manuel 
reviewed plaintiff's file which included an investigation by Jennifer 
Grindstaff, an HR Manager. Grindstaff conducted the investigation to 
determine whether plaintiff was being subjected to unfair scrutiny by 
Simmons. After interviewing ten employees in plaintiff's area, 
Grindstaff concluded that Simmons treated all employees the same and 
that plaintiff was repeatedly disrespectful to Simmons. Additionally, 
Grindstaff reported that several employees felt that plaintiff made 
the environment "toxic." (Doc. 84 at 18). Manuel relied on 
Grindstaff's report and concluded that disciplinary action was 
appropriate because of the deficient quality of plaintiff's work. 
Simmons agreed with Manuel's conclusion. Because plaintiff was on 
step 4, the next step of the procedure was termination.
Manuel and Simmons jointly made the decision to terminate 
plaintiff's employment and received approval from HR.
Plaintiff filed this action against Cessna alleging that Cessna 
retaliated against him for filing a worker's compensation claim, 
interfered with his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 
violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and breached the 
2008 settlement agreement. Both Cessna and plaintiff move for summary
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judgment on all claims.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
The rules applicable to the resolution of this case, now at the 
summary judgment stage, are well-known and are only briefly outlined 
here. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) directs the entry of 
summary judgment in favor of a party who "show[s] that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
An issue is "genuine" if sufficient evidence exists so that a rational 
trier of fact could resolve the issue either way and an issue is 
"material" if under the substantive law it is essential to the proper 
disposition of the claim. Adamson v. Multi Community Diversified 
Svcs., Inc., 514 F.3d 1136, 1145 (10th Cir. 2008). When confronted 
with a fully briefed motion for summary judgment, the court must 
ultimately determine "whether there is the need for a trial-whether, 
in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can 
be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be 
resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). If so, the court cannot grant summary
judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
III. Pro Se Standard
Before analyzing Cessna's motion for summary judgment, the court 
notes plaintiff is not represented by counsel. It has long been the 
rule that pro se pleadings, including complaints and pleadings 
connected with summary judgment, must be liberally construed. See 
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1991); Hill v. 
Corrections Corp. of America, 14 F. Supp.2d 1235, 1237 (D. Kan. 1998).
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This rule requires the court to look beyond a failure to cite proper 
legal authority, confusion of legal theories, and poor syntax or 
sentence construction. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. Liberal 
construction does not, however, require this court to assume the role 
of advocate for the pro se litigant. See id. Plaintiff is expected 
to construct his own arguments or theories and adhere to the same 
rules of procedure that govern any other litigant in this district. 
See id.; Hill, 14 F. Supp.2d at 1237.
IV. Analysis
A. Workers' Compensation
Plaintiff asserts that he was terminated in retaliation for 
filing a workers' compensation claim. The elements for a claim of 
retaliatory discharge are:
(1) The plaintiff filed a claim for workers 
compensation benefits or sustained an injury for which he 
or she might assert a future claim for such benefits; (2) 
the employer had knowledge of the plaintiff's workers 
compensation claim injury; (3) the employer terminated the 
plaintiff's employment; and (4) a causal connection existed 
between the protected activity or injury and the 
termination.
Rebarchek v. Farmers Co-op. Elevator, 272 Kan. 546, 553-54, 35 P.3d 
892, 898-99 (2001).
After plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts 
to Cessna to show an articulate, non-retaliatory reason for the 
discharge. Bausman v. Interstate Brands Corp., 252 F.3d 1111, 1116
(10th Cir. 2001). "If the employer meets this burden, the burden 
shifts back to the plaintiff but the plaintiff must show clear and 
convincing evidence that he or she was terminated in retaliation for 
exercising rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act." Id.
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The first three elements are not in dispute. Plaintiff filed a 
workers' compensation claim in February 2011 and was terminated in 
January 2012. To establish the fourth element, a plaintiff typically 
shows proximity in time between the claim and discharge. Close 
temporal proximity between a workplace injury or the filing of a 
workers compensation claim and the adverse employment action may be 
"highly persuasive evidence of retaliation.” White v. Tomasic, 31 
Kan. App.2d 597, 602, 69 P.3d 208, 212 (2003) (internal citations
omitted). In this case, there was an eleven-month delay between 
plaintiff's claim and his firing. The court finds that the delay 
between plaintiff's claim and his termination is not sufficient to 
establish a causal connection. Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 
F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 1999)(twelve weeks is not sufficient).
Plaintiff has not offered any additional circumstantial evidence to 
show that he was fired because he filed a workers' compensation claim. 
Therefore, summary judgment on this claim is granted in favor of 
Cessna.
Even if the court determined that plaintiff met his prima facie 
case, plaintiff cannot establish retaliation under the burden-shifting 
approach set forth in Rebarchek. Cessna has established by sufficient 
evidence that its non-retaliatory legitimate reason for terminating 
plaintiff was his failure to perform his job satisfactorily. Since 
Cessna has carried its "burden of production, the presumption raised 
by the prima facie case is rebutted, [and] drops from the case." 
Robinson v. Wilson Concrete Co., 913 F. Supp. 1476, 1483 (D. Kan. 
1996). The burden now returns to plaintiff.
Plaintiff has simply failed to provide an adequate response.
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"Timing alone, without any other evidence of retaliation, does not 
comport with the standard of proof for a retaliatory discharge claim 
in Kansas." Id. at 1484.
Cessna's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for 
workers' compensation retaliatory discharge is therefore granted and 
plaintiff's motion is denied.
B. FMLA Claims
Liberally construing plaintiff's allegations, plaintiff brings 
claims for FMLA interference and retaliation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 
2615(a)(1) and (a)(2), respectively. The FMLA affords a qualified 
employee twelve weeks of unpaid leave each year for serious health 
problems that prevent the employee from performing his job. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 2612(a)(1)(D).
An employee may recover damages against the employer when it has
interfered with the right to medical leave or reinstatement following
medical leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2615; Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln
-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 960 (10th Cir. 2002).
To make out a prima facie claim for FMLA interference, a 
plaintiff must establish (1) that he was entitled to FMLA 
leave, (2) that some adverse action by the employer 
interfered with his right to take FMLA leave, and (3) that 
the employer’s action was related to the exercise or 
attempted exercise of his FMLA rights.
Jones, 427 F.3d at 1319.
To state a prima facie case of retaliation, [a plaintiff] 
must show that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2)
[the defendant] took an action that a reasonable employee 
would have found materially adverse; and (3) there exists 
a causal connection between the protected activity and the 
adverse action.
Metzler v. Federal Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164, 1171 (10th 
Cir. 2006).
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Interference
Plaintiff alleges that Cessna interfered with his right to 
reinstatement due to his excessive FMLA absences. (Doc. 64 at 5 84). 
"In order to satisfy the second element of an interference claim, the 
employee must show that [he] was prevented from taking the full 12 
weeks’ of leave guaranteed by the FMLA, denied reinstatement following 
leave, or denied initial permission to take leave." Campbell v. 
Gambro Healthcare, Inc., 478 F.3d 1282, 1287 (10th Cir. 2007). The
facts in this case do not support any of those scenarios. Plaintiff's 
request for leave was granted and he clearly exhausted the full twelve 
weeks of leave available to him. (Doc. 84, exh. 1F at 5). Plaintiff 
also cannot show that he was denied reinstatement following leave 
because he was not on FMLA leave at the time of his termination. 
Therefore, plaintiff has failed to establish that Cessna interfered 
with his right to take FMLA leave. Cessna's motion for summary 
judgment on this claim is granted and plaintiff's motion is denied.
Retaliation
With respect to the retaliation claim, Cessna argues that 
plaintiff cannot establish a causal connection between plaintiff's 
leave and the termination because plaintiff's leave occurred more than 
three years ago. (Doc. 84 at 26-28). Cessna is incorrect, plaintiff 
was approved for intermittent leave in 2011 and did take FMLA leave 
as late as October 2011, when it was exhausted. (Doc. 84, exh. 1F). 
Notably, the disciplinary actions taken by Cessna coincide with 
plaintiff's FMLA leave on at least two occasions. Id. at 3-4. 
Therefore, a close temporal proximity exists between plaintiff's leave 
and his disciplinary actions. Nealey v. Water District No. 1 of
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Johnson County, No. 08-3144, 2009 WL 1303161 (10th Cir. May 12, 2009).
The burden now shifts to Cessna to establish a legitimate non­
discriminatory reason for plaintiff's termination. As stated 
previously, Cessna has satisfied its burden to articulate a legitimate 
reason for its actions. As a result, plaintiff must show pretext. 
Although temporal proximity is to be considered in determining whether 
Cessna's explanation is a pretext for retaliation, the Tenth Circuit 
has refused to allow even "very close temporal proximity to operate 
as a proxy for th[e] evidentiary requirement" that plaintiff 
demonstrate pretext. Annett v. Univ. of Kan., 371 F.3d 1233, 1241
(10th Cir. 2004); Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1138 
(10th Cir. 2005) ("[Temporal proximity] is not alone sufficient to 
defeat summary judgment.") (quotations omitted). "To raise a fact 
issue of pretext," plaintiff must "present evidence of temporal 
proximity plus circumstantial evidence of retaliatory motive." 
Metzler v. Federal Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164, 1172 (10th 
Cir. 2006). Here, plaintiff offers no circumstantial evidence to 
support a finding of retaliatory motive.
Therefore, Cessna's motion for summary judgment is granted and 
plaintiff's motion is denied.
C. ADA Discrimination
The framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas controls the 
analysis of plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim. See Johnson 
v. Weld County, Colo., 594 F.3d 1202, 1217 (10th Cir. 2010) .
Accordingly, plaintiff must first establish a genuine issue of 
material fact exists on the following three elements: "(1) [he] is a 
disabled person as defined by the ADA; (2) [he] is qualified, with or
- 12 -
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without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions 
of the job held or desired; and (3) [his] employer discriminated 
against [him] because of [his] disability." Id.
In the amended complaint, plaintiff has alleged that he has 
diabetes, cardiac dysrhythmia, mitral valve prolapse, irritable bowel 
syndrome and diabetic neuropathy. (Doc. 64 at 6). The regulations 
provide that diabetes will, "in virtually all cases" result in a 
finding of a disability, making the necessary individualized 
assessment "particularly simple and straightforward." 29 C.F.R. 
1630.2(3). Plaintiff, however, offers no evidence of his symptoms or 
his conditions. The medical records in this case concern plaintiff's 
surgery and limitations in his hands. Therefore, plaintiff has failed 
to establish that he is a disabled person as defined by the ADA.
Moreover, plaintiff has not produced any evidence to satisfy the 
third element of ADA discrimination. "[T]o establish the third 
element of a prima facie case of disability discrimination, the 
plaintiff must show that [he] was terminated because of [his] 
disability, or that the employer terminated the plaintiff 'under 
circumstances which give rise to an inference that the termination was 
based on [his] disability.'" Butler v. City of Prairie Village, 
Kan. , 172 F.3d 736, 748 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Morgan v. Hilti, 
Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997)). The third prong of the 
test does not impose an "onerous" burden, but it also is "not empty 
or perfunctory." Morgan, 108 F.3d at 1323-24. Plaintiff is required 
"to present some affirmative evidence that disability was a 
determining factor in the employer’s decision." Id.
Plaintiff has failed to offer any affirmative evidence that his
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diabetes, or the other conditions listed in the amended complaint, 
were determining factors in Cessna’s employment decision. See Morgan 
v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997). Accordingly,
plaintiff has not established the third element of his prima facie 
case and summary judgment is appropriate on this basis, regardless of 
whether plaintiff has a "disability" within the meaning of the ADA.
Cessna's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's ADA 
discrimination claim is granted and plaintiff's motion is denied.
D. Breach of Contract
Finally, plaintiff alleges that Cessna breached the 2008 
settlement agreement because it has not complied with Kansas law. In 
order to state a claim for breach of contract under Kansas law, 
plaintiff must establish the following elements: (1) the existence
of a contract between the parties; (2) consideration; (3) the 
plaintiff’s performance or willingness to perform in compliance with 
the contract; (4) defendant’s breach of the contract; and (5) that 
plaintiff suffered damage caused by the breach. Britvic Soft Drinks, 
Ltd. v. ACSIS Techs., Inc., 265 F. Supp.2d 1179, 1187 (D. Kan. 2003).
Plaintiff has wholly failed to introduce any evidence of a breach 
of the settlement agreement. Therefore, Cessna's motion for summary 
judgment on this claim is granted and plaintiff's motion is denied.
V. Conclusion
Cessna's motion for summary judgment is granted. (Doc. 83).
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied. (Doc. 82) .
Plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint (Doc. 79) is denied for the 
reasons stated in this court's January 4, 2013, order. (Doc. 61).
A motion for reconsideration of this order is not encouraged.
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Any such motion shall not exceed 3 double-spaced pages and shall 
strictly comply with the standards enunciated by this court in Comeau 
v. Rupp, 810 F. Supp. 1172, 1174 (1992). The response to any motion 
for reconsideration shall not exceed 3 double-spaced pages. No reply 
shall be filed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 12th day of September 2013, at Wichita, Kansas.
s/ Monti Belot____________________
Monti L. Belot
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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